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INTRODUCTION
Self-determination has become the central ideal governing medi-
cal treatment for patients generally and for terminally ill people spe-
cifically. Proponents of physician-assisted suicide set this ideal as their
core claim.1 Opponents assert that the practice, if legally recognized,
would inevitably slide into involuntary euthanasia for vulnerable peo-
ple.2 This article will explore internal tensions within the self-determi-
nation ideal as applied to the administration of death that give
plausibility to this "slippery slope" concern.
Three different aspects of the self-determination ideal illuminate
its vulnerability in approaching death. They are: (1) the modern -
rational, secular, self-determining - self as a philosophic proposition
(the intellectual history by which the modern conception emerged
from a quite different conception of the relation between "self' and
"cosmos"),' (2) the modern self as a psychological proposition (the
* Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Law, Yale University.
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developmental pathway by which contemporary individuals grow from
infancy into maturity toward a view of themselves through the cultur-
ally prized philosophic idea of the self)4 and (3) the modern self as an
American icon (the progressive acknowledgment of self-determina-
tion as an ideal in American cultural history from our Revolutionary
War through the abolition of slavery to the contemporary claims for
patient self-determination).'
I have two basic theses. First, by tracing the historic development
in Western culture of the idea of the rational, secular, self-determin-
ing self, we will see logical contradictions and vulnerabilities that per-
sist in that idea. By tracing contemporary individual psychological
development from infancy into the mature adult attainment of the
culturally prized conception of the rational, self-determining self, we
will see the emotional ambivalence and vulnerabilities that persist in
the self-perceptions of "normal adults." And, by tracing the apparently
triumphant progression of the self-determination ideal in American
cultural history, we will see a "dark side" to this progression, the way in
which this ideal both masked and gave impetus to the infliction of
terrible oppressions on vulnerable people. Second, these persistent
contradictions and vulnerabilities are magnified - for the culture and
for individuals - by the imminent approach of death.
I. THE MODERN SELF AS A PHILOSOPHIC PROPOSITION
The best account of the intellectual history and logical vulnerabil-
ity of the modern self is Charles Taylor's magisterial book, Sources of
the Self6 In this extended passage, Taylor provides a summary per-
spective on what he calls the "continuing philosophic discomfort" with
the modern conception of self:.
[I]f we follow the theme of self-control through the vicissi-
tudes of our Western tradition, we find a very profound
transmutation, all the way from the hegemony of reason as a
vision of cosmic order to the notion of a punctual [that is,
mechanistically objectifying] disengaged subject exercising
instrumental [self-]control.... The modern ideal of disen-
gagement requires a reflexive stance. We have to turn in-
ward and become aware of our own activity and of the
processes which form us .... Disengagement demands that
we stop simply living in the body or within our traditions or
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part III.
6. TAYLOR, supra note 3.
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habits and, by making them objects for us, subject them to
radical scrutiny and remaking.
Of course the great classical moralists also call on us to
stop living in unreflecting habit and usage. But their reflec-
tion turns us towards an objective order. Modern disengage-
ment by contrast calls us to a separation from ourselves
through self-objectification. This is an operation which can
only be carried out in the first-person perspective. It doesn't
tell us, like Stoicism, to be aware of what is worthwhile for
humans as such or, like Plato, to focus on the properties of
reason and desire and their relation to what we know about
the happy life.... This self which emerges from the objectifi-
cation of and separation from our given nature cannot be
identified within anything in this given. It can't be easily
conceived as just another piece of the natural world. It is
hard for us simply to list souls or minds alongside whatever
else there is. This is the source of a continuing philosophical
discomfort in modem times for which there is naturally no
analogue among the ancients. Various solutions have been
tried - reductionism, 'transcendental' theories, returns to
dualism - but the problem continues to nag us as un-
solved .... [T]his ungrounded 'extra-worldly' status of the
objectifying subject accentuates the existing motivation to
describe it as a self...
Here we see the origin of one of the great paradoxes of
modern philosophy. The philosophy of disengagement and
objectification has helped to create a picture of the human
being, at its most extreme in certain forms of materialism,
from which the last vestiges of subjectivity seem to have been
expelled. It is a picture of the human being from a com-
pletely third-person perspective. The paradox is that this se-
vere outlook is connected with, indeed, based on, according
a central place to the first-person stance. Radical objectivity
is only intelligible and accessible through radical
subjectivity.7
The core intellectual difficulty, the unstable shifts between the
first- and the third-person perspectives in the modem conception of
the self, is distilled by Taylor in his contrasting accounts of Descartes
and Montaigne, two thinkers whose work is the most direct fount of
the modern conception:
Descartes is a founder of modem individualism, because his
theory throws the individual thinker back on his own respon-
7. Id. at 174-76.
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sibility, requires him to build an order of thought for him-
self, in the first person singular. But he must do so following
universal criteria; he reasons as anyone and everyone [and
thus in the third person plural]. Montaigne is an originator
of the search for each person's originality; and this is notjust
a different quest but in a sense antithetical to the Cartesian.
Each turns us in a sense inward and tries to bring some order
in the soul; but this likeness is what makes the conflict be-
tween them particularly acute.
The Cartesian quest is for an order of science, of clear
and distinct knowledge in universal terms, which where pos-
sible will be the basis of instrumental control. The
Montaignean aspiration is always to loosen the hold of such
general categories of 'normal' operation and gradually prise
our self-understanding free of the monumental weight of the
universal interpretations, so that the shape of our originality
can come to view .... The search for the self in order to
come to terms with oneself, which Montaigne inaugurates,
has become one of the fundamental themes of our modern
culture .... There is a question about ourselves - which we
roughly gesture at with the term 'identity' - which cannot
be sufficiently answered with any general doctrine of human
nature... [or] some universal description of human agency
as such, as soul, reason, or will. There still remains a ques-
tion about me, and that is why I think of myself as a self.
This word now circumscribes an area of questioning.'
To paraphrase Taylor, what exactly is this self? When we explore it,
when we consult it, what is the source for what it tells us to do or to
be? The logical problem, as he identifies it, is that you cannot get to a
third-person perspective from within a first-person perspective. You
cannot logically be both inside and outside yourself at the same
moment.9
The approach of death and its imminent disappearance of the
self does not create a new intellectual problem for the sews internal
coherence but it introduces a new urgency - or perhaps better, an
insistent reiteration of the perennial modern urgency - to the un-
solved problem of the soul's order. As Daniel Callahan put it, the
principle of the self-determined death does not tell us what to choose,
it only tells us that we must choose but gives no guidance for that
8. Id. at 182-84.
9. See id. at 177-84.
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choice."0 This is the substantive "emptiness" of the self that is sup-
posed to choose how to die. Perhaps the simplest and most vivid de-
piction I can offer of the unsettling and unsatisfying character of this
"emptiness" is from a New Yorker cartoon of several years ago: the
drawing showed a group of children in a progressive nursery school,
finger-paintings on the walls, with books, blocks, computer screens
scattered around the room; and one child is saying to the teacher,
"Mrs. Lowry, do we have to do whatever we want to do today?"
Taylor addresses this substantive problem in the first part of his
book, before he embarks on his historical reconstruction of the intel-
lectual development of the modern self. In this opening part, he ob-
serves that "one of the most basic aspirations of human beings [is] the
need to be connected to, or in contact with, what they see as good, or
of crucial importance, or of fundamental value."'" This is not simply a
sociological observation for Taylor. "How could it be otherwise," he
asks, "once we see that this orientation in relation to the good is essen-
tial to being a functional human agent?"1 2 Taylor does not directly
claim - at least in this book, he does not claim - that "the good" is
discoverable. He is, however, intensely critical of the dominant con-
clusion among modern philosophers that this is an erroneous quest:
The point of view from which we might constate that all or-
ders are equally arbitrary, in particular that all moral views
are equally so, is just not available to us humans. It is a form
of self-delusion to think that we do not speak from a moral
orientation which we take to be right. This is a condition of
being a functioning self, not a metaphysical view we can put
on or off. So the meta-construal of the neo-Nietzschean phi-
losopher - 'in holding my moral position, I am imposing
(or collaborating in the imposition of) a regime of truth on
the chaos, and so does everyone' - is just as impossible as
the meta-construal of the empiricist - 'in holding my moral
position, I am projecting values on a neutral world of facts,
and so does everyone'. Both are incompatible with the way
we cannot but understand ourselves in the actual practices
which constitute holding that position: our deliberations,
our serious assessments of ourselves and others. They are
not construals you could actually make of your life while liv-
10. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE: IN SEARCH OF A PEACEFUL
DEATH 35-37 (1993).
11. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 42.
12. 1&
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ing it. They clash, in other words, with the best available ac-
count of our moral life. 13
In his historical reconstruction, Taylor demonstrates how the
classical conception of "the good" as discoverable by and external to
human thought was not discarded wholesale by what he calls the "turn
inward" that is characteristic of the modern idea of self.14 He identi-
fies an intermediate step in Augustine's thought as originating "that
strand of Western spirituality which has sought the certainty of God
within."1 5
There is a certain family of 'proofs' of the existence of God
whose basic form is typically Augustinian. The d~marche
which is common to them all is something like this: my expe-
rience of my own thinking puts me in contact with a perfec-
tion, which at one and the same time shows itself to be an
essential condition of that thinking and also to be far beyond
my own finite scope and powers to attain. There must then
be a higher being on which all this depends, i.e., God.16
This Augustinian position, which sees the interior "self' as corre-
sponding to some exterior force, was transformed but not wholly re-
jected by Descartes. 7 His transformative move, to put it in simplified
form, was to portray the inward-looking individual as the external ob-
server of himself who, by this shift in perspective, subjected his "self'
to rational self-mastery guided by the individual's "sense of his own
dignity as a rational being."1 " As Taylor vividly puts it, "the disen-
gaged subject stands in a place already hollowed out for God; he takes
a stance to the world which befits an image of the Deity."1"
But in Descartes's thought, as well as in the thinking of Locke
and Kant in the following century, the theistic perspective within
Christian culture persisted as a framework and mediator of their shift
between the first- and third-person: "The awesome powers of human
reason and will are God-made and part of God's plan; more, they are
what constitutes the image of God within us."2 The Cartesian per-
spective laid the groundwork for the radical break so visible in our
century: "insofar as the sources [of morality] now lie within us, more
13. Id at 99.
14. See id at 127-39.
15. Id. at 140.
16. Id
17. See id. at 143.
18. Id. at 152.




particularly, within certain powers [of rationality] we possess, the basis
is there for an independent, i.e., non-theistic morality."2 1 This step
was not, however, taken by Descartes, Locke or Kant.22 Their theism
receded into the background of their thinking; especially with Kant,
man's "dignity as a rational self-controlling agent" is very much in the
foreground. 23 But their background theism effectively solved the
problem for them of imagining some grounding from which an exter-
nal observer (a judgmental God or an objectified third-party self) can
view the internal (subjective first-person) actor. 24
Theism is not the only intellectual strategy for solving this prob-
lem. The utilitarian apostles of the Enlightenment and scientific ra-
tionality in the nineteenth century relied on a secularized premise of
"a potential harmony of interests between human beings" - a har-
mony that each individual can perceive if he shifts from a first-person
egoism to a third-person universalism. 25 In this shift, we are "no
longer imprisoned in the self [but] are free to pursue the universal
good. '26 In this secular version, "the relief of suffering, human but
also animal, [moved] to the centre of the social agenda. '27 But in this
century, the coherence of this presumed correspondence between
first-person and universalized third-person suffering has been
exploded.28
The logical coherence of this correspondence depended on the
existence of some understandable common metric by which one per-
son's suffering could be compared to another's. 29 As the modern crit-
ics of utilitarianism have convincingly demonstrated, however, no
such common metric is available; one person's subjective experience
and preferences are not necessarily commensurable with another's.30
Accordingly the "common good" - the Holy Grail of the harmony of
human interests - cannot be discerned by any straight-forward com-
piling of the sum of individual preferences. The shift from the first- to
a universalized third-person perspective is not logically possible. In
this shift, some first-person perspectives must necessarily be favored





25. Id at 329-30.
26. Id. at 331.
27. Id.
28. See id
29. See id at 332.
30. See id. at 375.
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ternal standard other than "everyone's first-person perspective."
Without God or a God-like resolving authority (a dictator in the lit-
eral, as well as authoritarian, sense of the word), there is no satisfac-
tory harmonizing standard available.
However compelling this objection may be as an abstract proposi-
tion, it is difficult to ascribe any widespread sense of spiritual malaise
to the force of this logical objection. Nonetheless, contrary to Oliver
Wendell Holmes' famous dictum that the life of the law has not been
logic but experience, logic and experience mutually shape one an-
other in human affairs - as is demonstrated by the historical develop-
ment of the modern idea of the self. The logical conundrum in
nineteenth century utilitarianism - the problem of finding a com-
mon metric for inherently incommensurable individual subjective
preferences - was not widely seen as an urgent, insoluble problem
until the social experience of the twentieth century stripped away
comforting assumptions about "inherent human nature" that had
tempered the demands for rigorous logical proofs of the potential
harmony of human interests.31 So long as it was plausible to believe
that most people most of the time were benignly disposed toward one
another, that most people were inclined toward mutual communal
support, the strict logical impossibility of comparing incommensura-
ble subjectivities was hardly visible even to systematic social theorists.
In the harsh light, however, of the vastly brutal inflictions of human
suffering in this century, crowned if not epitomized by the Nazi Holo-
caust, it has become difficult for anyone to see anything but the logi-
cal conundrum of the incommensurability of individual subjectivities.
This is not the popular language. Destruction of community, so-
cial isolation and unbridgeable hostility among individuals is the more
widely accessible expression of this logical conundrum. But the popu-
lar and philosophic languages are precisely equivalent. Alisdair
Maclntyre has aptly portrayed this interaction of logic and experience,
the way in which social experience interacts with each individual's
sense of his own logical coherence:
[M] oral debates in... [our contemporary] culture generally
have a highly specific form. Disagreement on some particu-
lar issue leads back rather quickly to the assertion of two or
more incompatible premises .... [W]e have no neutral court
of appeal or testing-place where these rival claims may be
weighed against one common standard. We have no overrid-
ing criterion of an established and defensible kind.
31. See TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 375.
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Hence important moral arguments in our culture are
systematically unsettleable. They become all too soon exer-
cises in assertion and counter-assertion. But it is not simply
the case that we lack the means to convince each other ra-
tionally. If two reasonable parties to such a moral debate
cannot discover criteria, appeal to which will settle the mat-
ter impersonally for both, then neither party can be basing
his own conviction on such an appeal. Confronted with the
dilemma which creates the debate, each individual can only
make explicitly or implicitly an arbitrary choice. Unreason
and arbitrariness are internalized. 2
Maclntyre's observation captures a belief that is wide-spread in con-
temporary American society - a conviction not only that "unreason
and arbitrariness" are the defining qualities of our social life but an
underlying suspicion that each individual himself lacks reasoned, non-
arbitrary guides for charting his own course. This is the sense in
which I understand Maclntyre's statement that "unreason and arbi-
trariness are internalized"33 by each individual who participates in the
moral debates characteristic of our time.
This substantive emptiness, the sense of uncertainty and drift -
accompanied by the wish for some external, third-party direction to
fill the emptiness of self-determination - is thus not a new problem
generally. But it is emphatically a new problem for decision-making
about death. To speak only of an American context, self-determina-
tion has been a central pre-occupation and a centrally prized value
since at least the founding of the Republic - the break from the grip
of the Mother Country, Great Britain - and then the generalization of
this principle represented by the abolition of slavery.34 But medical
matters - and especially questions around death and dying - had
been exempt from the application of the principle until very recently.
Until around 1970, medical paternalism was the generally accepted
social rule for interactions between patients and physicians.3 5 The ex-
traordinary rise in prestige and social authority of the medical profes-
sion occurred just after the Civil War.36 This was not in response to
empirically demonstrated medical success in treating disease or avert-
32. Alisdair Maclntyre, Patients as Agents, in PHILOSOPHICAL MEDICAL ETHICS: ITS NA-
TURE AND SIGNIFICANCE 197, 198-99 (Stuart F. Spicker & H. Tristan Englehardt, Jr. eds.,
1977).
33. Id. at 199.
34. See infra Part III.
35. See MacIntyre, supra note 32, at 204-07 (discussing physician authority over
patients).
36. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 134 (1982).
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ing death; when these demonstrations did appear, relatively late in the
nineteenth century, the medical profession was already well on its way
toward a specially sanctified social role in taking custody of death and
dying.3 7
The application of the self-determination ideal to the administra-
tion of death does not create the logical conundrum in the modern
sense of self; but the novelty of this application amplifies this incoher-
ence. When the "self' thinks about its imminent death - that is, about
its own disappearance as a subject - the very thought vividly depicts
the paradoxical incoherence in the idea of a "self' that can simultane-
ously be both the subject and the object of its examination. Imminent
death - the approaching moment when a thinker is losing its grip on
its image of itself as a subject - highlights the conundrum that a
thinker can think of itself as something different from itself, as an
object of its contemplation.
With routinized practice, we may learn to suppress this uneasi-
ness in imagining self-determining decisions about death -just as we
have learned in other contexts to ignore the paradoxical incoherence
in the modern conception of self. But as Taylor has observed, "philo-
sophic discomfort" cannot be wholly suppressed. Some sense of in-
completeness, logical error, lingers on.
II. THE MODERN SELF AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROPOSITION
A sense of uneasiness, of "error" in the idea of the self when con-
fronting death is also highlighted from another perspective - that is,
in the pathway for individual psychological development of the mod-
em sense of self. If I ask myself, how did I develop a sense of myself as
an independent, autonomous adult from my starting-point as an ut-
terly dependent infant for whom self-determined choice was not "on
the agenda," there is an apparent common-sense answer. This answer
is that as I grew older, I learned to think of myself in this new way - I
learned to set aside my "childish ways," my infantile self-conception,
and replace it with a mature adult's self-determining self-conception.
But here we encounter a somewhat different version of Taylor's para-
dox: who is this "I" who was available to learn this new self-concep-
tion?38 Where did "he" come from? If we say that I learned enough
to become "him," we are into an infinite regress: and where did this
"he" come from?
37. See id. at 138-40.
38. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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There is a puzzle here that our common-sense conception of the
smooth, learned transition from infantile dependency to adult inde-
pendence papers over. The imminence of death brings this puzzle
crashingly back into view, and requires each of us to go back over the
steps that led us from infantile dependency to adult independence. I
do believe that retracing our steps is possible. The imminence of
death does not necessarily overwhelm our adult capacity for self-deter-
mination; but the process is much easier to assert than to experience.
In order to identify the difficulties that lie in the way of this process, it
is important to explore what is involved in retracing those steps - or,
in other words, to identify the psychological steps that were involved
in the first place as each of us traveled the path from infantile depen-
dence to adult autonomy.
In setting out the pathway for individual psychological develop-
ment, I draw on a psychoanalytic understanding and rely specifically
on the work of Hans Loewald, one of the most astute and evocative
psychoanalytic theorists who built on Freud's foundation."9 Freud's
original conception of the psychoanalytic enterprise was very much an
expression of the self-objectifying, rationalist ambition embodied in
the modern conception of self.4" But that scientistic framework has
been radically modified by Freud's successors, 41 even as he himself
called it into question in the evolution of his own thinking.42 In his
influential essay, The Waning of the Oedipus Complex, Loewald observed:
With reference to the problem of individuation and the
status and valuation of the individual, psychoanalysis appears
to be in an awkward position. On the one hand, it seems to
stand and fall with the proposition that the emergence of a
relatively autonomous individual is the culmination of
human development. How this may come about and what
interferes with such an outcome, resulting in psychopathol-
ogy, is a most important aspect of psychoanalytic research,
reconstruction, and treatment....
On the other hand, owing in part to analytic research,
there is a growing awareness of the force and validity of an-
other striving, that for unity, symbiosis, fusion, merging, or
identification - whatever name we wish to give to this sense
of and longing for nonseparateness and undifferentia-
tion.... The more we understand about primitive mentality,
39. See generally HANS LOEWALD, The Waning of the Oedipus Complex, in PAPERS ON PSYCHO-
ANALYSIS 384-405 (1980).
40. See HANS LOEWALD, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE INDIVIDUAL 15-16, 73 (1978).
41. See LOEWALD, supra note 39, at 402-03.
42. See id. at 399.
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which constitutes a deep layer of advanced mentality, the
harder it becomes to escape the idea that its implicit sense of
and quest for irrational nondifferentiation of subject and ob-
ject contains a truth of its own, granted that this other truth
fits badly with our rational world view and quest for objectiv-
ity .... In the course of ... [psychoanalytic] explorations,
unconscious processes became accessible to rational under-
standing, and at the same time rational thought itself and
our rational experience of the world as an "object world" be-
came problematic .... [O]bjectivity, rationality, and reality
themselves are not what we thought them to be, not absolute
states of mind and the world that would be independent of
and unaffected by the generative process-structures of mind
and world.4"
This nuanced account of the psychoanalytic understanding of the
modem self offers the same perspective on its individual developmen-
tal pathway as Taylor's historical excavations: both perspectives
demonstrate the powerful grip of the modern conception of the au-
tonomous self on our contemporary communal and seff-understand-
ing and, at the same time, the contingency and fragility of this
conception. For our purposes, moreover, the psychoanalytic perspec-
tive has the same limited use as Taylor's historical account. Taylor,
that is, did not purport to give any definitive causal explanation for
the development of the modern conception of self; though he alluded
at various points to the likely impact of broad economic and social
factors, and the likely interaction between these factors and the intel-
lectual developments that he charted, his focus throughout was in re-
constructing the historical narrative as such of the idea of self.
Many psychoanalytic theorists, beginning with Freud, have not
been so relatively modest in their ambitions. The bedrock strength of
the psychoanalytic method of inquiry is not, however, in its capacity to
yield causal explanations, either of the progression of individual de-
velopment or (as Freud himself was constantly led to put forward) of
historical and cultural development. The real strength of the method-
ology is in its capacity to unearth buried and otherwise unacknowl-
edged ideas that individuals carry with them, to discern narrative
progressions in these ideas from individuals' early childhood into
their maturity, and to identify commonalities among individuals in
these narrative progressions. Taylor and other intellectual historians
use the accumulated manuscripts of centuries to carry out their exca-
43. Id. at 401-02.
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vations while psychoanalysts use the tracings from memories, dreams
and free associations of their patients in their explorations.
The one important difference between the two enterprises for
our present purposes is that, more than an historian's reconstruction,
a psychoanalyst's reconstruction of an individual's narrative progres-
sion is likely to demonstrate the continued contemporary force of the
excavated ideas for that individual. This is a difference in degree
rather than in kind, but it is important for our purposes in light of a
central - and to my mind, quite plausible - psychoanalytic premise
which is not so clearly avowed in the work of cultural historians: the
premise that an individual retains a strong memory of the ideas he
held in past times and, notwithstanding the dramatic inconsistency
between these ideas and his current conceptualizations, the individual
is always prone (and especially likely in times of psychological stress)
to fall back into his older ways of thinking.
This is the psychoanalytic premise of the "return of the re-
pressed."44 This same force may well be at work in the history of cul-
tural groups. Freud, notoriously and excessively, relied on this
premise in his works of cultural history; but the existence of powerful
mechanisms of preservation, transmission and ready recapitulation of
earlier, apparently superceded cultural ideas are much less obvious
and compelling than for the existence of these mechanisms in specific
individuals viewed as such.45
For individuals in our contemporary culture, the proposition illu-
minated by psychoanalytic inquiry is the narrative progression by
which the modern conception of self - self-objectifying, rationalist,
individualist - emerges from infancy. The progression, both as it can
be reconstructed from work with adults and from psychoanalytically
informed investigation with young children, is from the infantile con-
ception, as Loewald put it, of "nonseparateness and undifferentiation"
from others (and especially from the most important nurturers in the
child's life) to a mature sense of separated individuality at the core of
the modern conception of self.46
Loewald's account, which draws together the strands of a broad
consensus in post-Freudian psychoanalytic thinking, begins with an
analytic case illustration:
44. See ROBERT A. PAUL, MOSES AND CIVILIZATION: THE MEANING BEHIND FREUD'S MYrH
1 (1996).
45. See id. at 1-4.
46. See LOEWALD, supra note 39, at 402.
1999]
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
A student, working for a degree in the same field as his fa-
ther's, had trouble completing his thesis. He was brilliant;
the thesis so far had progressed well. His father had died
about a year earlier. The patient began to procrastinate; he
felt strongly that he needed support and advice from his the-
sis advisor. But he knew quite well that he was perfectly capa-
ble of finishing the work on his thesis without help. He
chided himself for his delaying techniques. In part, these
took the form of paralyzing doubts about the originality of
his work, regarding which at other times and for good rea-
sons he had no doubts. He also wanted encouragement and
support from me, but he kept telling me that it was wholly
his responsibility, not the advisor's or mine. Becoming in-
dependent, taking responsibility for the conduct of his own
life, was one of the themes that had come up repeatedly dur-
ing the analysis. As he continued, over several hours, to in-
sist that completing the thesis was his and no one else's
responsibility, but that he could not bring himself to work on
it, it dawned on me that he might be speaking of responsibil-
ity also in a sense not consciously intended by him. In addi-
tion to or underneath the meaning of responsibility as
accountability to himself, as self-autonomy, perhaps he was
talking about being responsible for a crime. It would be a
crime he wished to delay, avoid, or undo. An interpretation
along these lines led to further work on his relationship with
his father, his murderous impulses and fantasies regarding
him, his ambitions and fears of outdistancing him, and on
his guilt about these ambitions (in part already fulfilled) and
about his father's death.4"
From this case example, Loewald draws out this generalized
proposition:
[T]he assumption of responsibility for one's own life and its
conduct is in psychic reality tantamount to the murder of the
parents, to the crime of parricide, and involves dealing with
the guilt incurred thereby. Not only is parental authority de-
stroyed by wresting authority from the parents and taking it
over, but the parents, if the process were thoroughly carried
out, are being destroyed as libidinal objects as well ... 48
This appellation of parricide is easy to dismiss or to caricature for a
reader unaccustomed to psychoanalytic works. I can only ask this skep-
tical reader to consult the full text of Loewald's article in order to see
47. Id. at 388.
48. Id. at 389.
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the sensitivity and subtlety with which he weaves this appellation into a
recognizable account not simply of his patient's dilemma but more
generally of "the ambiguity of adult responsibility and autonomy."49
For our purposes, I want to emphasize two propositions. The
first, which Loewald directly states, is that an imagined act of inflicting
death is interwoven into the very developmental progression by which
we come to think of ourselves as autonomous, self-determining indi-
viduals.5 ° The second, which is implicit in Loewald's account, is that
this infliction is carried out against an internalized image that each
individual holds in his own mind.51
As Loewald portrays it, imagined parricide is "a developmental
necessity" but not a psychological inevitability.5 2 An individual can
rigorously repress any parricidal wishes; but this in itself, as Loewald
says, "is an unconscious evasion of the emancipatory murder of the
parents, and a way of preserving infantile libidinal-dependent ties with
them."5 ' Thus imagined parricide is the first step in the immature
individual's progression away from the infantile conception of "non-
separateness and undifferentiation" toward the modern sense of self.
The second forward step in this developmental progression is a
sense of guilt.54 This step too is not universally experienced; it is quite
possible for an individual to feel parricidal wishes (or even to act on
those wishes) without any consequent sense of guilt. But this is also a
developmental failure - a refusal, in Loewald's words, to "bear[ ] and
master[ ] the guilt of parricide by internalizing atonement. ' 55 The
eruption of parricidal wishes into action is, from this perspective, an
individual's refusal to carry forward his developmental progression
wholly in an internalized framework, where the act, the guilt and the
atonement can succeed one another. Action is not the only possible
interruption of this course; there are many ways for an individual to
disown any guilt for the parricidal act, as well as disowning the act
itself. The eruption into action is, however, an especially vivid in-
stance of externalization; for many, such actions do not represent an
evasion of punishment but an "inexhaustible need for punishment"
which is satisfied by the predictably harsh social response to the deed.
49. hL at 388.
50. See id, at 390.
51. See generally id. at 388-89.
52. I& at 390.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 390-91.
55. Id- at 389.
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There are, of course, many other ways to become derailed in this
labyrinthian psychological progression; and no one acts alone in trav-
ersing this course. As Charles Taylor noted, each of us is "a self only
among other selves";56 and this is not simply a descriptive or defini-
tional proposition but also a developmental proposition. As Loewald
observed, " [p] arents resist as well as promote [this developmental pro-
gression] no less ambivalently than children carry it OUt."' 5 7 But if the
progression follows the necessary steps toward the development of the
autonomous self, then the internal psychological experience of parri-
cide is succeeded by guilt which in turn is succeeded by "atonement or
reconciliation" and " [w] hat will be left if things go well, is tenderness,
mutual trust, and respect, the signs of equality."5 So for Loewald's
illustrative patient:
Bearing the burden of guilt makes it possible to master guilt,
not in the hasty form of repression and punishment, but by
achieving a reconciliation of conflicting strivings. Complet-
ing his thesis was for my patient, to a significant degree, the
outcome of reconciling parricide with love for his father, and
of reconciling his quest for emancipation and self-responsi-
bility with his desire for identification and becoming one
with his father. I understand his eventual ability to complete
the thesis in time (as well as other positive developments) as
a confluence and integration of conflicting needs rather
than mainly as evidence of defense against one or the other
of these currents.59
This reconciliation - and consequent emergence of the autono-
mous individual prized as such in our contemporary culture - is not,
however, a permanent attainment. "To master all of these currents
permanently and without the aid of degrees and waves of repression
appears to be beyond human capacity."6 ° Successive events in the or-
dinary cycles of our lives, moreover, prompt the unsettling and retrac-
ing of these developmental steps. As our parents age and then die, as
we become parents and our children move from dependence toward
independence in part through their struggles with us, as we ourselves
proceed (and sometimes encounter declining health) on the inevita-
ble path toward death - in all of these experiences, our developmen-
56. See TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 35.
57. LOEWALD, supra note 39, at 390.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 391.
60. Id at 392.
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tal attainments toward autonomy and self-responsibility are re-opened
and re-worked.
Indeed, by Loewald's account, those who have been most success-
ful in attaining the kind of reconciliation of conflicting impulses that
is the hallmark of mature autonomy are especially open to this
fluctuation.
[S] elf-responsibility ... involves appropriating or owning up
to one's needs and impulses as one's own, impulses and
desires we appear to have been born with or that seem to
have taken shape in interaction with parents during infancy.
... When I speak of appropriating our desires and impulses
... I do not mean repressing or overpowering them. I mean
allowing or granting them actively that existence that they
have in any event, with or without permission. Following the
lead of the word responsibility, one may say that appropria-
tion consists in being responsive to their urgings, acknowl-
edging that they are ours. A harsh, unyielding superego is
unresponsive and in that sense irresponsible. Unless modi-
fied it leads to self-destruction or to its having to be bribed
and corrupted. Self-inflicted or "arranged" punishment is
one form of such corruption; it merely assuages guilt for a
while. Responsibility to oneself, in the sense of being re-
sponsive to one's urgings in the manner I described, involves
facing and bearing the guilt for those acts we consider as
criminal.61
How, then, does the actual approach of death in an individual's
life affect this arduously obtained mature sense of self?. The key to
understanding the developmental significance of approaching death
hinges on the fact that the infliction of parricide is an internalized,
imagined event (whether or not it actually takes place). In this inter-
nalized representation of the parricidal act, the individual can be un-
derstood to emerge from an undifferentiated conception of himself
and others, in effect, by "splitting" his own self-representation into two
parts and then eradicating one of those parts; the "parental" part,
while leaving imaginatively intact the separated individuated part, the
"self."
This is of course a metaphorically simplified schematic represen-
tation of a complex internal transaction. But it is clear that, whatever
its specific steps in its internalized representation, the pathway by
which the independent self emerges from a parricidal act remains in-
scribed within the mature individual's mental apparatus. Thus when-
61. Id at 392-93.
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ever death looms large in a mature individual's mind, some echo
arises of the prior parricide and its structurally embedded tracings of
a self-inflicted or self-defining killing.
This internalized structural understanding of the developmen-
tally blurred lines between killing another and killing self was evident
in Freud's portrayal of suicide in his essay Mourning and Melancholia:
[W] e have come to recognize a self-love of the ego which is
so immense, in the fear that rises up at the menace of death
. . . that we cannot conceive how this ego can connive at its
own destruction. It is true that we have long known that no
neurotic [no one?] harbours thoughts of suicide which are
not murderous impulses against others re-directed upon
himself, but we have never been able to explain what inter-
play of forces could carry such a purpose through to execu-
tion. Now the analysis of melancholia shows that the ego can
kill itself only when ... it can treat itself as an object, when it
is able to launch against itself the animosity relating to an
object - that primordial reaction on the part of the ego to
all objects in the outer world. Thus in the regression from
narcissistic object-choice the object is indeed abolished, but
in spite of all it proves itself stronger than the ego's self.6 2
The ego thus kills itself by an internal representation of killing a
primordial object - by reenacting some version of its earlier
imagined parricide. There is, however, no reason to restrict this ac-
count to actual suicides. The same psychological representation
would occur whenever the ego imagines itself to be dead - whenever,
that is, one's own death looms large in an individual's imagination.
Even more, this same internalized representation is precipitated
whenever an individual imaginatively experiences any emotionally
charged death, whether his own or another's. As Freud noted, in im-
passioned mourning for a loved person, "the shadow of the object fell
upon the ego . . . [and] the loss of the object became transformed
into a loss in the ego.'"63
If the intense imagination of death prompts a mature individual
to re-experience his imagined act of parricide, the ego-loss that was
his first developmental step toward an individuated conception of self,
then a reiteration of the next developmental step would also follow:
the sense of guilt as a reaction to the parricide. Again I underscore:
this is not a universally experienced process, but these are the devel-
62. 4 SIGMUND FREUD, Mourning and Melancholia, in COLLECTED PAPERS 162-63 (Joan
Riviera, trans., 1956).
63. Id. at 159.
[VOL. 2:177
SELF-DETERMINATION
opmental steps necessary to lead an individual to our culturally and
historically prized sense of the individuated self. Accordingly, as re-
peated reconstructions of adult psychic life by psychoanalytic observ-
ers have demonstrated, an individual who has developmentally
attained our recognized modern conception of individuated self-de-
termination will be led to reiterate these developmental steps in con-
fronting his own death or the deaths of intensely engaged others.
I might best convey this central proposition with a rough meta-
phor: that the modem self is the software that currently programs our
conceptualizing capacity and when the question appears "what is
death," the programmed response is "death = wrong." We can imag-
ine other answers to this question along the lines that death is "being
gathered in to God" or that death is a natural biological phenomenon
and thus is morally neutral. But though we can offer these answers to
the death question, the programmed software of the modem self over-
rides them with the persistent message "wrong, wrong, wrong." For
Loewald's psychoanalytic account, the "wrong," the error, is a moral
wrong that inspires guilt. For Charles Taylor's philosophic account,
the wrong is a logical error that inspires confusion. But the equation is
the same from both directions: the death of the "self' is erroneous, is
wrong.64
To see that we are caught in this reiterative loop - "death =
wrong" - makes comprehensible some otherwise puzzling aspects of
our contemporary approaches to death. For examples:
* our culture's persistent search for the defining character-
istics of the "good death" and the equally persistent elu-
siveness of this quarry;
* the persistent warfare waged against death by the medical
profession, notwithstanding its general commitment to a
biologically mechanistic model whose logic should seem-
ingly portray death as a natural, inevitable phenomenon;
* the widespread belief among the general public, and
among seriously ill people specifically, that pain should
accompany death and their resistence to requesting or ac-
64. Belief in the intrinsic immorality of death was embedded in Western culture much
earlier than the appearance of the modern sense of an individuated, self-determining self.
This conviction is at least as old as the Old Testament. Death first appears in the Hebrew
Bible as punishment for Adam and Eve's disobedience to God's injunction against eating
from the tree of knowledge. Genesis 2:17 ("in the day that you eat of it you shall die"). The
New Testament continues this tradition in the climactic redemptive vision of the Christian
Bible. Revelation 21:1, 4 (in "a new heaven and a new earth ... death shall be no more").
The internal vulnerabilities of the modern self give expressive form to this persistent cul-
tural belief in the wrongfulness of death.
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cepting available, effective modalities for reducing or
eliminating pain;
65
the corresponding resistence within the medical profes-
sion to prescribe - or even adequately to educate them-
selves regarding - currently available, effective pain
palliation.66
This deeply embedded conviction of death's wrongfulness - to
pursue my crude metaphor - is not hardwired into human concep-
tual capacity; we might well be able to reprogram ourselves. If, that is,
intense thoughts of death prompt individuals to regress from their
mature self-conceptions into earlier developmental stages, then it is
also within their grasp to re-travel those pathways back toward their
prior mature attainments. But this pathway is never easy to traverse:
new obstacles can appear, obstacles successfully overcome at one time
can become insurmountable when they reappear at a later time and
the ordinary process of growing older inevitably brings new or height-
ened obstacles. As Loewald observed,
If we do not shrink from blunt language, in our role as chil-
dren of our parents, by genuine emancipation we do kill
something vital in them - not all in one blow and not in all
respects, but contributing to their dying. As parents of our
children we undergo the same fate, unless we diminish them.
If eventually some sort of balance, equality, or transcending
conciliation is achieved, children and parents are fortunate.
It is a balance or harmony that in the external no less than in
the internal arena remains vulnerable.6 v
It is equally possible to achieve "some sort of balance.., or tran-
scending conciliation '' 68 between the idea of death as inevitable and
acceptable and the idea of death as inherently wrong. But this is also,
as Loewald put it, "a balance or harmony that in the external no less
than in the internal arena remains vulnerable."69 I am especially skep-
tical of the capacity of the self-determination ideal as the potential
instrument for re-shaping our individual conviction of the wrongful-
ness of death. One source of my skepticism comes from the historical
development of the self-determination ideal in American culture spe-
65. See Jane Ingham & Kathleen Foley, Pain and the Barriers to Its Relief at the End of Life:
A Lesson for Improving End of Life Health Care, 13 HOSPICE J. 89, 92-93 (1989).
66. Id. at 93.





cifically. This is the third aspect of the development of the modern
sense of "self' and self-determination that I want to explore.
III. THE MODERN SELF AS AN AMERICAN CULTURAL ICON
We are accustomed to portraying American history as a kind of
triumphalist progression - that we applied the self-determination
ideal at the moment of the American Revolution only to white men of
property but then, inspired by the stirring commitment of the Decla-
ration of Independence to the equality of all mankind, we carried out
the unavoidable logic of that ideal to all black men by abolishing slav-
ery and then to all women as well as men by providing female suffrage,
and now on to others, such as seriously ill people who want to choose
their own deaths.
But this triumphalist account ignores - I would even use the psy-
choanalytically-tinged word, this account represses - a dark side of the
story. The unmistakable historical fact is that each step of this appar-
ent forward-moving progression - each act of liberation carried out in
the name of the self-determination ideal - was accompanied by a
powerful reaction, a powerful oppression directed against some other,
more socially vulnerable group. This attack was, moreover, specifi-
cally directed against the imagined capacity, the right, of the members
of this group to see themselves and be seen as "self-determining
selves." At the very moment, that is, that this capacity, this right, was
awarded to some people, it was withheld from - and even diminished
from its previous, though tentative, recognition in - other people.
Take, for example, the Revolutionary moment when the white
colonists seized their independence from Great Britain on the basis of
the self-determination ideal.7" In this struggle, the colonists repeat-
edly described themselves as "slaves" of Great Britain; and it was com-
monplace among the British to accuse the colonists of rank hypocrisy
because they themselves held black slaves in subjection." The revolu-
tionary generation itself was quite conscious and articulate about their
own hypocrisy. Jefferson - the author, of course, of the Declaration of
Independence - was explicit about the injustice, the criminality, of this
hypocrisy. In his Notes on the State of Virginia, he wrote, "The whole
commerce between master and slave is a perpetual exercise of the
most boisterous passions, the most unremitting despotism on the one
part, and degrading submission on the other.... I tremble for my
70. See Robert A. Burt, Comments on James Oakes, "The Compromising Expedient," 17 CAR-
DOZO L. REv. 2057, 2058 (1996).
71. See id.
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country when I reflect that God is just: [and] that his justice cannot
sleep for ever. "72 Notwithstanding this lamentation, Jefferson and his
fellow-countrymen did nothing to end the servitude of their slaves,
which might appear indictment enough of them.73 More stunningly,
however, various moves had been instituted before the Revolution
that looked toward the ultimate abolition of slavery - the enactment
of abolition statutes in some Northern states, the easing of conditions
for manumission in many Southern states, the prohibition on impor-
tation of slaves in many states.7 ' But by 1789, when the Constitution
was written, these ameliorating, potentially liberating moves were es-
sentially abandoned and in a relatively short time, the newly liberated
white male colonists in both the South and the North were united in
the new conviction that slavery would be a permanent institution in
the United States, although restricted for practical reasons to the
plantation economies of the South.75
This hardened attitude toward slavery was adopted in the first in-
stance by people who directly acknowledged the injustice, the wrong-
fulness, of their conduct76 - and then this new, more draconian policy
was carried forward, and its internal logic was extended to increasingly
harsh measures, by people who insisted that there was no inconsis-
tency, no hypocrisy, no injustice at all in their conduct: that slaves
were inherently inferior, that they were perpetual children who did
not deserve and were not capable of self-determination. 77
Then came the Civil War and the abolition of slavery - presuma-
bly a new step forward for the self-determination ideal. But here too,
at the same moment that black slaves were freed, other socially vulner-
able groups not only failed to gain the same advantages; these groups
were actually subjected to increasingly harsh terms of subordination.
Two groups in particular exemplify this apparent paradox in post-Civil
War America: women and mentally disabled people.7' Before the
72. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 162-63 (William Peden ed.,
1955).
73. See DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1770-
1832, at 174-81(1975).
74. See id. at 86-89.
75. SeeJames Oakes, "The Compromising Expedient" Justifying a Proslavely Constitution, 17
CARDozo L. REv. 2023, 2056 (1996).
76. See ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 163-72 (1992).
77. See id. at 164 n.39.
78. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives'
Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1147 (1994); DAVIDJ. ROTHMAN, THE DIS-
COVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 130-33 (1971);
ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 41-52, 181-86 (1959).
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Civil War, significant ameliorative moves had been made to provide
some relatively limited but nonetheless clear social liberations for
these subordinated groups.79 Before the War, moreover, there was
widespread social acknowledgment of commonalities between these
groups - especially regarding the status of women - and the op-
pressed social status of black slaves."0 But after the War, the common-
alities were not simply ignored; having liberated the slaves, the
dominant American culture was not content to be simply inconsistent
or passively hypocritical in its conduct toward these other groups.
The dominant culture intensified the subordination of these other
groups, increased the very injustice that had been acknowledged re-
garding black slaves.8"
The most striking instance of this intensified subordination of wo-
men was in the legal restrictions on abortion adopted in every state
immediately after the Civil War. 2 Before the War, abortion was freely
available until the so-called "quickening" of the fetus, that is, until
about the end of the first trimester.8 3 Under the laws adopted after
the War, abortions were legally prohibited except to save the mother's
life,84 and the newly-organized medical profession was given the exclu-
sive role of deciding whether or not the mother's life was sufficiently
endangered. (This was, incidentally, the first clear move in American
culture giving exclusive custody to the medical profession over any
life-and-death decision; one hundred years later, this initial grant of
cultural authority to doctors had spread across all such decisions -
without, of course, any acknowledged sense of wrongdoing.) Regard-
ing mentally disabled people, their intensified subordination was im-
plemented in the dramatic post-Civil War expansion of state
residential institutions 5 and their conversion from the avowed thera-
peutic and restorative missions that had marked their origins in the
1820s to an exclusively custodial mission carried out with ruthless bru-
tality.8 6 This brutal custodial mission was obviously hurtful and unjust
79. See JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NA-
TIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900, at 22-23 (1978); ROTHMAN, supra note 78, at 269-95.
80. See Siegel, supra note 78, at 1148.
81. For the linkage drawn between slavery and the status of women by the early femi-
nist advocates before the Civil War, see FLEXNER, supra note 78, at 47; for the efforts of
postbellum feminists to characterize women's uncompensated household labor as a form
of enslavement and their general failure to secure recognition of women's proprietary
claims in this labor, see Seigel, supra note 78, at 1192-95, 1208-09.
82. See MOHR, supra note 79, at 205-25.
83. See id. at 22-23.
84. See id at 224-26.
85. See ROTHMAN, supra note 78, at 130.
86. See id. at 269-95.
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to anyone who chose to look at it - but American culture resolutely
looked away from these injustices until more than one hundred years
after the Civil War.
The dark side of the abolitionist triumph does not end, however,
with the post-Civil War treatment of women and mentally disabled
people. This darkness is even more starkly visible in the social treat-
ment of the newly freed slaves, the supposed beneficiaries of the new
application of the self-determination ideal. Within a relatively short
time after the War, blacks were effectively re-enslaved in the South -
with the knowledge and implicit authorization of the white North -
but in conditions that were even more harsh, more life-threatening to
the former slaves than under their previous condition of servitude.
Blacks were now "no one's property" - no white man, that is, had any
strong motive to protect blacks from the lynchings and other depreda-
tions of white vigilantes;8 7 blacks were openly deprived of all voting
rights, contrary to the clear commands of the post-Civil War Fifteenth
Amendment; and they were subjected to a rigorous regime of racial
segregation, a form of subordination and humiliation that had been
unknown before the Civil War.89
This does not mean that no one benefitted from the new exten-
sions of the self-determination principle embraced by the Civil War.
By the time that blacks had been effectively re-enslaved - by the end
of the nineteenth century, that is - the clear beneficiary of this new
extension had been revealed to be white men engaged in commercial
enterprise."° This was indeed an extension beyond the original reach
of the self-determination principle in the constitutional arrangements
that followed the American Revolution - an extension, that is, beyond
the aristocratic land-owners who dominated American political life for
some fifty years after the Revolution. Post-Civil War developments
strongly suggested that the abolitionist struggle on behalf of black
slaves had been, to a significant degree, epiphenomenal - that the
underlying, and only partially acknowledged struggle, was more fun-
damentally between white men about "free labor," "wage slavery" and
constraints on individual economic enterprise.91 This struggle had
87. SeeJOEL WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE: BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS IN THE AMER-
ICAN SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION 57-58 (1984).
88. See id. at 247-48.
89. See id. at 249-58.
90. See BURT, supra note 76, at 237-51.
91. See generally ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVL WAR (1970).
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been fought by white men over the bodies and over the symbolism of
the black slaves but the struggle was not at its core about them as such.
I am, of course, painting here with a very broad brush and pulling
together a range of materials that might seem quite disparate. But I
hope I have made clear why it is important to range so broadly across
these various ways of thinking about the self-determination ideal. My
goal in all of this is to dig beneath the kind of abstract arguments of
principle that are conventionally put forward in the current debate
about physician-assisted suicide - the kind of triumphalist story that
American culture has at its core embraced the fundamental value of
self-determination, and that there is an inner logic, an inner consis-
tency, to this principle that demands its extension from white men of
property to blacks to women to dying patients.
I don't deny this inner logic. But this inner logic conceals an
internal fragility in the very idea of "self-determination" and the "seW'
itself which Charles Taylor's philosophical account uncovers. 2 This
inner logic conceals violence in the psychological formation of the
"independent self" and an inescapable sense of guilt, of wrongdoing,
that Hans Loewald's psychoanalytic account uncovers.93 This inner
logic conceals a dark accompaniment that is revealed by the American
historical experience of the supposed progressive triumph of the self-
determination ideal - what I would call the inherent inclination of
this ideal toward harmful inflictions on socially vulnerable people,
that is, a "slippery slope" toward injustice and oppression.
I use the term "inherent inclination" toward a slippery slope quite
advisedly. I do not believe that this is more than an inclination, how-
ever strong it might be - I do not believe that it is an inevitable neces-
sity that each step that we see as moral progress toward the unfolding
of individual liberty and self-determination must be accompanied by
some terrible infliction of injustice. I don't want to believe this, of
course; and I resist reading the historical record, dark as it is, as re-
quiring this belief. But I do strongly believe that the inclination is
there, and the simplistic drum-beats of praise for the self-determina-
tion ideal that are commonplace in public debates today, especially
around the issue of physician-assisted suicide, refuse to acknowledge
this darker side of the ideal - and this very refusal, this resistance
makes it more rather than less likely that the darker side will emerge.
I believe this to be true because I believe that the central impulse
toward the inflictions on vulnerable people that have accompanied
92. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 49-61.
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the historic progression of the self-determination ideal arises from the
refusal, the resistance, to acknowledging the internal weaknesses of
this ideal and the complicated sense of wrong-doing, the guilty feel-
ings, that accompany this ideal. This may appear to be unsupported
speculation; the account I have given thus far is highly speculative,
though it does have logical and empirical support. But I ask just this:
assume, for the purposes of argument, that I have given a correct ac-
count of the weaknesses in the very concept of self-determination and,
in particular, that the psychoanalytic perspective on the development
of the mature sense of self is correct. If we assume the correctness of
the developmental progression that Hans Loewald described - that
the infant moves toward a differentiated sense of his own "self' by
formulating in his own mind an image of the parent and then destroys
that image in an imagined act of violence, an act of parricide - then
we have a possible, and even a highly plausible, causal explanation of
the reason why the assertion of the self-determination ideal carries
with it the inclination toward inflictions of oppression and injustice.
This causal explanation was put forward in an essay that Sigmund
Freud wrote in 1916 - an essay that he entitled Criminals from a Sense of
Guilt.9 4 In that essay, Freud described patients whom he had treated
who told him about various criminal actions that they had engaged in.
Freud said:
Analytic work [with these patients] brought the surprising
discovery that such deeds were done principally because they
were forbidden, and because their execution was accompa-
nied by mental relief for their doer. [The patient] was suffer-
ing from an oppressive feeling of guilt, of which he did not
know the origin, and after he had committed a misdeed, this
oppression was mitigated. His sense of guilt was at least at-
tached to something. Paradoxical as it may sound, I must
maintain that the sense of guilt was present before the mis-
deed, that it did not arise from it, but conversely - the mis-
deed arose from the sense of guilt. 5
This paradoxical idea - that a sense of guilt produces wrongdo-
ing, and the wrongdoing then relieves (at the same time that it rein-
forces) the sense of guilt - offers an explanation, for example, for the
escalating brutality and degradations of the slavery regime in the years
following the American Revolution. The underlying but unacknowl-
edged guilt in the revolutionary leaders - among Jefferson and the
94. 14 SIGMUND FREUD, Ciminals from a Sense of Guilt, in THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE




others - was not simply or even primarily the hypocrisy that accompa-
nied their success in claiming freedom from British "enslavement"
while persisting in their enslavement of others. From a psychoanalytic
perspective, the underlying guilt that would prompt wrongdoing
would have arisen from the violence of the revolutionary leaders' own
struggle in obtaining their freedom and right to self-determination
against Great Britain - to be very literal about it, from the act of parri-
cide that this war of independence inevitably represented. I know I
may be straining credulity for some readers, even those who are trying
in the best of faith to assume the correctness of the psychoanalytic
account I have set out; but, without insisting on the matter too strenu-
ously, I would urge that before completely rejecting this speculative
account of our founding fathers' state of mind, we go back to the
history books and see how strenuously revolutionary leaders tried to
absolve King George of any responsibility for the oppressions they felt,
how hard they worked to blame his policies and his pig-headedness on
his evil advisors and on the Parliament, and how hard and long they
tried to portray themselves as loyal and submissive to him but opposed
only to the exercise of Parliamentary sovereignty.96
When we turn to the American Civil War, we find the same inti-
mate connection between violence and the apparent triumph of the
self-determination ideal; the abolition of slavery came, after all, only
through the most destructive, the bloodiest war that Americans have
ever fought, before or since. And, if I may beat this drum a bit more,
96. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, 1763-89, at 69-72 (1977);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 165 (1992):
In the decades leading up to the Revolution scarcely a piece of American writing,
whig or tory, did not invoke the parent-child image to describe the imperial rela-
tionship. The king was the "father" and Great Britain was the "mother country"
and the colonists were their "children." Because the image was so powerful, so
suggestive of the personal traditional world in which most colonists still lived,
almost the entire imperial debate was inevitably carried on within its confines. At
times the polemics between whigs and tories appeared to be little more than a
quarrel over the proper method of child-rearing. Whigs argued that Britain was
an unnatural parent, cruel and unfeeling in her harsh treatment of her chil-
dren.... In reply the tories accused the colonists of being insolent and ungrate-
ful brats and demanded to know "whether any parent can put up with such
disrespectful and abusive treatment from children, as Great Britain has lately re-
ceived from her colonies." The whole imperial struggle collapsed into a family
squabble.
The whigs, of course, invoked the latest, most enlightened thinking about
the parent-child relationship: that parents with unruly children had only them-
selves to blame. But for children and subordinates to disobey their fathers and
masters in this still traditional world was so terrifying and unnatural that whigs
inevitably resorted to the image of a contract in order to explain the imperial
relationship and to justify their sense of equality and their rebelliousness.
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there was also a strong implication, of parricide in the waging of the
Civil War. Abraham Lincoln was more or less explicit about this in his
earlier writings anticipating the possibility of war - the implication of
parricide was that the country was engaged in destroying the work of
the Founding Fathers,9 7 the Union that they had carefully crafted in
the Constitution.98 Lincoln and the North, of course, portrayed them-
selves as the loyal sons of their Founding Fathers;99 but they knew,
they fully understood, that their Fathers' Union had been a voluntary
association of the Northern and Southern states and that, in waging
war to preserve the Union, they were profoundly transforming it and
in this sense displacing their Fathers' work.100
To put it in simplest terms (with or without the flavor of parri-
cide), the violence and destructiveness of the Civil War provoked feel-
ings of guilt and these feelings themselves produced wrongdoing,
produced acknowledged but nonetheless irresistible acts of injustice
inflicted on the most vulnerable targets - on women, on mentally dis-
abled people, and on the freed blacks themselves.0 1 In the wake of
the Civil War, white Northerners and Southerners became - in
Freud's formulations - "criminals from a sense of guilt."'1 2
Perhaps this account is right, perhaps it is wrong. But I think its
plausibility should serve at least as a warning when we turn to the
claims for self-determination of dying people and especially to claims
for assistance in committing suicide. In this context - as in the waging
of war - the violence and destructiveness of the specific acts involved
are unmistakable, no matter how much claims of justice and dignity
97. See GEORGE B. FORGIE, PATRICIDE IN THE HOUSE DIVIDED: A PSYCHOLOGICAL INTER-
PRETATION OF LINCOLN AND His AGE 286 (1979).
98. See generally CHARLES B. STROZIER, LINCOLN'S QUEST FOR UNION: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
MEANINGS (1982); EDMUND WILSON, PATRIOTIC GORE (1962).
99. See FORGIE, supra note 97, at 77-80, 85.
100. See id. at 287.
101. See supra notes 80-95 and accompanying text.
102. It is also possible to put the matter in an even more straight-forward way, without
relying on a psychoanalytically-based causal account. It may be that this cultural-historical
conjunction of one group expanding its claim to self-determination while constricting
some other group's equivalent claim at the same time can be explained by Orlando Patter-
son's observation that the idea of "freedom" only emerged in Western culture at the same
time that chattel slavery was embraced as such, and that the internal coherence of the idea
of "freedom" depended on its direct comparison and juxtaposition with an "un-free" status.
See generally 1 ORLANDO PATT-ERSON, FREEDOM (1991). This account is yet another way to
depict the internal fragility of the self-determination ideal. From this perspective, at each
historical moment that some group saw itself as escalating its claim to freedom and self-
determination, that group was impelled to acknowledge the internal weakness of its claim
- its incoherence except as a comparative depiction, in Patterson's terms - by depicting
some other group as not-free and subordinate to others' determinations regarding them.
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might justify these violent acts. The. stressfulness of these acts - the
incredible stressfulness of the approach of death, however it might
come - affects everyone involved, not just the dying person, not just
the immediate family, not just the treating physician who may or may
not be willing to assist in hastening that person's death. The propo-
nents of physician-assisted suicide claim that we can enact laws to en-
sure that the death-hastening acts are restricted only to true
volunteers who are imminently dying and who have been given full
opportunity to avail themselves of other treatment alternatives. 10 3 We
certainly can write these words into statutes. And both the propo-
nents and opponents of assisted suicide certainly agree that it would
be immoral, unjust, abusive, to persuade seriously ill people that they
should kill themselves because they are costly or bothersome to their
families or to society. 10 4 We all agree it would be immoral, unjust,
abusive to forget about voluntariness and hasten the death of retarded
people or confused and senile people who are costly and bothersome
to others. We all know that this was what the Nazis did and we are not
Nazis.
But if the ideal of self-determination is conceptually tenuous, as
Taylor's historical-philosophic account suggests; and if the ideal car-
ries with some inescapable sense of wrongdoing and guilt, as
Loewald's developmental-psychoanalytic account suggests; and if the
progressive realization of the ideal in American historical experience
has recurrently been accompanied by terrible oppressions against vul-
nerable people - if all of this just might be true, then we are danger-
ously fooling ourselves if we quickly and easily assume that
implementation of the self-determination ideal in the practice of phy-
sician-assisted suicide won't slide into these and other abuses that its
opponents fear. The common conviction between proponents and
opponents that these abuses would be wrong is not an adequate pro-
tection against this "slippery slope." We must reckon with the terrible
paradox that Freud identified - that the very fact that we are con-
vinced that these abuses are wrong could be exactly the reason that we
will be driven to inflict them.10 5 We will become "criminals from a
sense of guilt" - and, in order to continuously relieve ourselves of this
sense of guilt, we will constantly be tempted into escalating
wrongdoings.
103. For a critique of this claim, see generally Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legali-
zation of Physician-Assisted Suicide: Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 1
(1996).
104. See CARLos F. GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH 104 (1991).
105. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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There is, of course, potential wrongdoing on all sides of the as-
sisted suicide issue. It is wrong to stand by and do nothing while des-
perately ill people cry out for some assistance to hasten their death
and thereby relieve their suffering. I don't mean to dismiss these
claims; and if we do dismiss them, we can lock ourselves into an esca-
lating pattern of wrongdoing that carries all the risks I have identified
for the practice of physician-assisted suicide. Indeed, I believe that
the terrible abuses routinely inflicted on dying people by the contem-
porary overuses of medical technology can be explained by this same
dynamic of "criminality from a sense of guilt" as dying people are
feared and abandoned by those who are supposed to care for them.
But I must reiterate my conviction that we fool ourselves if we think
that patient control - that the self-determination ideal - is an ade-
quate corrective to these abuses. We fool ourselves if we imagine that
this ideal does not carry its own dark implications. We must approach
any solution in the administration of death with caution, with skepti-
cism, with a sober recognition of the complexity and the pitfalls of the
enterprise.
Claims for physician-assisted suicide are not, of course, the only
context in which the self-determination ideal has been pressed into
service regarding the administration of death. Beginning with Karen
Quinlan's case in 1976,106 American courts generally have embraced
this ideal as the basis for a right to refuse medical treatment, even if
that refusal would lead to death. 10 7 (The United States Supreme
Court effectively endorsed this proposition as a constitutional right in
its 1990 Cruzan ruling.) 08 There are, of course, rational differences
between the claim to refuse life-prolonging medical treatment and the
claim for provision of medical treatment that would hasten death;10 9
there is a possible distinction between "passive" and "active" embrace
of death, there is a difference between the assaultive implications of
unconsented medical treatment as compared to the passive resistance
involved in a refusal to provide lethal treatments. Nonetheless, the
close connection between both of these choice-making claims and the
death of the choice-making self equally pushes forward all of the vul-
nerabilities inherent in the idea of self-determination that I have iden-
106. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (stating
that the right to privacy is broad enough to include a patient's decision to refuse unwanted
medical treatment under certain circumstances).
107. See id. at 665.
108. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (assuming that a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment that encompasses the right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition).
109. See id. at 279.
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tified. I believe, accordingly, that the claim for the right to refuse life-
prolonging treatment must be approached with the same caution, the
same skepticism, the same alertness to its inherent potential for a slide
toward injustice as the claim for the right to assisted suicide.
The actual implementation of the right to refuse treatment has
not, however, generally been subjected to this kind of scrutiny. Propo-
nents for physician-assisted suicide in particular have argued that the
refusal right is an unqualified success and have invoked its preceden-
tial force for their added claims. This was the position taken by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in its ruling that New York
state could not rationally prohibit assisted suicide because it accepted
a right to refuse life-prolonging treatment:
Physicians do not fulfill the role of "killer" by prescribing
drugs to hasten death any more than they do by discon-
necting life-support systems. Likewise, "psychological pres-
sure" can be applied just as much upon the elderly and
infirm to consent to withdrawal of life-sustaining equipment
as to take drugs to hasten death. There is no clear indication
that there has been any problem in regard to the former,
and there should be none as to the latter.110
The court cited no empirical support for its claim that the refusal
right has been problem-free; 111 and in any event, the court was mis-
taken in allocating the burden of proof. The proper question is not
whether there is "clear indication [of] any problem" but whether pro-
ponents of extending the refusal right can clearly demonstrate its safe
application, in light of the logical and psychological vulnerabilities of
the self-determination ideal as applied to death and our cultural his-
tory of abuse in the implementation of that ideal generally. 112 It does
110. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 730 (2nd Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Vacco v. Quill, 521
U.S. 793 (1997).
111. See id.
112. The actual experience of the refusal right has not been widely studied. See generally
Sandra H. Johnson, End of Life Decision Making: What We Don't Know, We Make Up; What We
Do Know, We Ignore, 31 IND. L. REV. 13 (1998). The most extensive recent empirical study
found that the right was not in fact being implemented. See A Controlled Trial to Improve
Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for
Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591, 1593-95 (1995). The most
intriguing finding of this study was that the failure of implementation was not simply de-
rived from physician resistance but that patients and their families themselves appeared
reluctant to discuss treatment options or to insist on treatment termination, even when the
patients had previously completed advance directives to this effect. See id. at 1595. (See also
Joanne Lynn, Unexpected Returns: Insights from SUPPORT, in To IMPROVE HEALTH AND
HEALTH CARE 1997 at 175 (S. Isaacs &J. Knickman eds., 1997): "[T]he problem was much
more difficult than that doctors did not hear their patients' requests; it was that no one
involved was talking about these subjects."). This reluctance may itself be a response to
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seem likely to me that the refusal right carries less risk of sliding to-
ward expansive and oppressive application than the claim for physi-
cian-assisted suicide. Unlike physician-prescribed or administered
lethal medication, refusal of life-prolonging treatment will lead to
death only if there is some independent life-threatening illness.
Nonetheless, there is a significant potential that, for specially vulnera-
ble people, the right to refuse will become transformed (subtly or
overtly) into a duty to refuse life-prolongation - a prospect that war-
rants cautious skepticism and intensive empirical investigation, not
ideologically driven boosterism on behalf of the self-determination
right.
I have painted with broad strokes in this article. My concerns
have been abstractly stated, my examples have stayed at a high level of
generality. I want to end where I believe the core of the matter must
be: in the individual experience of a dying patient. It is of course very
difficult to get inside this experience, no matter how close and how
empathic we might try to come. The experience itself is so shifting,
calls so much into question about our ordinary sense of "self' - of
bodily and spiritual intactness and integrity - that even the first-per-
son accounts that dying people leave behind cannot fully communi-
cate "what it is truly like" - even if the experience were not highly
variable among individuals and among cultures. Nonetheless I want
to end with one imaginative depiction by a gifted novelist, Wallace
Stegner, whose artistic sensibility offered an account of one woman's
experience that both summarizes the kinds of concerns I have tried to
set out here and gives a human face to those concerns.
Near the end of Wallace Stegner's novel, Crossing to Safety, Charity
Lang is dying of cancer and she says, to her husband and two closest
friends,
There's no decent literature on how to die. There
ought to be, but there isn't. Only a lot of religious gobbledy-
gook about being gathered in to God, and a lot of biological
talk about returning your elements to the earth. The biolog-
ical talk is all right, I believe it, but it doesn't say anything
about what religion is talking about, the essential you, the
hostility from the medical establishment; or it may be, as I am inclined to believe, that
patients and their families implicitly understand the vulnerabilities of self-determination in
the face of death. Those who take the former perspective can argue that the SUPPORT
study indicates the need for intensified efforts to override physician and patient misgivings.
For my part, the SUPPORT study suggestively, though not conclusively, confirms my skepti-
cism about pressing forward on the self-determination pathway in the administration of
death. See generally Ellen H. Moskowitz &James Lindemann Nelson, Dying Well in the Hospi-
tal: The Lessons of SUPPORT, 25 HAsTINGS CENTER REP. (Special Supplement) at S3 (1995).
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conscious part of you, and it doesn't teach you anything about
how to make the transition from being to not-being. They
say there's a moment, when death is certain and close, when
we lose our fear of it. I've read that every death, at the end,
is peaceful. Even an antelope that's been caught by a lion or
cheetah seems not to struggle at the end. I guess there's a big
shot of some sedative chemical, the way there's a big shot of
Adrenalin to help it leap away when it's scared. Well, a shot
will do for quick deaths. The problem is to get that same
resignation to last through the weeks or months of a slow
one, when everything is just as certain but can't be taken
care of with some natural hypo. I've talked to my oncologist
about it a lot. He has to deal with death every day, seventy-
five percent of his patients die. But he can't tell me how to
do it, or give me any references in medical literature that will
help. Medical literature is all statistics. So I'm having to find
my own way.' 13
This is a richly compressed account of our contemporary ideal of
the autonomous self approaching death. Charity skims through the
archeology and architecture of this ideal: its origins as a response to
the failures of cultural frameworks of meaning offered by religion and
by science; the underlying fear that the ideal attempts to address; its
impetus toward a quick exit ("a shot," as she says three times); the
immediate suspicion she expresses that this way out is not consistent
with the goals of "resignation" and "peace" that a supremely confident
self-control should attain; and, through it all, both the heroism and
the loneliness of the ideal - "I'm having to find my own way."
Charity's soliloquy beautifully illustrates the vulnerability of the
modern, rational, self-determining "self' in facing the prospect of
death. In a brief compass she states the animating premise for the
pursuit of order ("there ought to be [a guiding literature], but there
isn't"); she tries what Charles Taylor calls the Cartesian strategy of self-
objectification ("the biological talk") and scientific inquiry" 4 (talking
to her oncologist, but finding that the "medical literature is all statis-
tics"); she makes an attempt at what Taylor calls Montaigne's strategy
of finding an utterly original self" 5 (there is an "essential you," she
says, that is not adequately captured by conventional "religious gob-
bledygook") but she concludes that this supposed essence "doesn't
teach you anything about how to make the transition from being to
not-being." And she powerfully speaks of the fear now driving her
113. WALLACE STEGNER, CROSSING TO SAFETY 236 (1987).
114. See supra text accompanying note 9.
115. See id.
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inquiry - that, at the edge of death, she feels like "an antelope that's
been caught by a lion or cheetah."
But after traversing the conceptual routes offered by the modern
conception of self, she is left only - as Taylor puts it - with "an area
of questioning ' 16 and not an answer for ordering the soul, without
the prospect of a "peaceful [end] ... the sedative ... the resignation"
that she seeks. She has nothing but a question about her "self' with-
out any guidance to help that "seW' find its answer - "So I'm having
to find my own way."
Acknowledging this loneliness - the sense of isolation and the
incompleteness, the insufficiency of the "seW' in facing death - is our
best guide for thinking about the administration of death in American
law, medicine and culture. There is no solution to the "problem of
death." There is no "magic bullet," either in assisted suicide to hasten
death or in medical technology to stave off death. There is no satisfy-
ing way of taking control of death, either through exertions of self-
determination or through exertions of medical, technological control.
There is at its core the loneliness of death that demands that we look
to one another for comfort and companionship, for a loving and per-
sistent presence together in the face of death. This loneliness de-
mands that we promise we will not abandon one another even when,
especially when, we are most fearful of being abandoned. This is easy
to say, but very hard to do. We make it harder for ourselves if we
pretend that some simple formula, some simple idea, can sustain us in
approaching death.
116. Id
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